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ABSTRACT 
The Final Rule on certification requirements for 
induction motors issued by the Department of Energy con-
tains different assumptions for the compliance and the 
enforcement procedures. These differences may yield 
unexpected results under certain conditions. For example, 
at times, the enforcement proc_cdure can support a higher 
nameplate rating for a motor lot than would be possible by 
an appropriate application of the compliance procedure 
and vice versa. This paper examines, in detail, the nature 
of the problem and gives several examples where the 
enforcement plan fails to achieve its intended purpose. 
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1. Introduction · 
About 60% of the electricity produced in industrial-
ized countries is used to power motors. In these same 
countries, electricity demand is challenging generation 
capacity and is causing congestion in transmission and 
distribution systems. Solutions to this situation include: 
l. The expansion of generation sources, both conven-
tional and novel such as wind power, 
2. The expansion of transmission and distribution sys-
tems, 
3. The growing use of distributed generation to increase 
available power without transmission congestion on 
existing lines, 
4. Improving load efficiency. 
Because they are such a large fraction of the load, 
efforts to improve load efficiency often include efforts to 
improve motor efficiency. If a significant number of high-
er efficiency motors are to be introduced into the load mix, 
the buyers must have an incentive to purchase higher effi-
ciency motors and a means to identify which motors have 
higher efficiency. The motivation is usually supplied by a 
combination of three factors. One is the desire to reduce 
operating costs. A higher efficiency motor can have a 
lower life cycle cost than a less efficient one. The second 
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~s a de~i~e to attrac_t customers_ by showing that a company 
ts sensJttve to env1ronmental Jssues and a good neighbor. 
The third is governmental incentives that may be positive, 
e.g. tax incentives, or legal, e.g. regulations. 
The technical issue, however, is the identification of 
higher efficiency motors. The metrology base exists so 
that a buyer can compare any two motors for the same load 
and identifY the more efficient motor. Because of the large 
volume of sales, however this is not a practical approach 
in most cases. The approach used in the United States and 
most other countries is that the motor manufacturer labels 
a motor lot with an efficiency rating. The manufacturer 
then puts sufficient controls on the variability of incoming 
materials and the manufacturing process to have confi-
dence that the entire lot is appropriately labeled. In the 
U.S., the historical procedure for this labeling process was 
a voluntary one, complying with a standard promulgated 
by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (1]. 
On October 5, 1999, the Department of Energy (DOE) 
issued its Final Rule [2] on the implementation of the 
Energy Policy Act (EPAct) [3] establishing government 
specified testing procedures for the verification of the effi-
ciency of induction motors, efficiency labeling require-
ments for induction motors, compliance certification 
requirements, and enforcement procedures. The publica-
tion of this Final Rule followed years of public debate on 
the various issues. During this time, industry groups ( espe-
cially NEMA, National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association), energy conservation advocates, individual 
manufacturers, motor users, and private citizens had an 
opportunity to comment on the course of action that DOE 
had been proposing in various editions of its preliminary 
Proposed Rule [4]. The publication of DOE's Final Rule is 
the culmination of the U.S. Government's efforts to regu-
late induction motor efficiency dating back at least to the 
mid-1970s [5]. 
This paper shows that this rule, while providing 
enforceable procedures, does not necessarily permit the 
selection of more efficient motors by following the speci-
fied efficiency ratings. The problem can become worse as 
manufacturing quality control improves. 
2. Background Information and Definition of 
the Problem 
Prior to the late 1970s electric motors were not 
required to have a full-load efficiency value stamped on 
their nameplate. At that time, in response to rising energy 
costs, the motor industry adopted new voluntary NEMA 
standards regarding the method to follow in showing a 
full-load efficiency on the motor nameplate. These stan-
dards were quickly followed by all major manufacturers 
and proved useful for motor users in determining energy 
consumption. In 1992 the Department of Energy mandat-
ed that all integral horsepower induction motors of stan-
dard design meet specified minimum efficiency levels 
published in tables arranged by horsepower (up to 200 
HP), motor speed, and motor enclosure type [3]. The law 
gave motor manufacturers five years to bring their pro-
duction in compliance but specifically said that no motor, 
among the designs covered by the law, could be sold in the 
USA after the end of October 1997 if it did not meet the 
minimum efficiency mandated in the DOE tables . 
It is safe to say that, at the time the law was enacted, 
a majority of induction motors sold in this country did not 
meet the mandated DOE efficiencies. Furthermore, a sub-
stantial portion of motors manufactured at the time had 
efficiencies so far below the minimum requirements that 
they could be brought into compliance only with a major 
redesign. It is a great credit to the motor industry that it 
was able, in the relatively short period of time of five 
years, to upgrade its production to the point of not only 
meeting the requirements of the law, but also introducing 
new motor lines that far exceeded them. This often 
required radical re-tooling and the adoption of new pro-
duction methods, but by October 1997 the conversion had 
been accomplished. 
To appreciate the degree of improvement achieved, 
one has to consider the net reduction offull-load losses for 
each motor design. Efficiency values of integral horse-
power induction motors have always been generally 85% 
or higher, so that incremental improvements stated in 
terms of efficiency result in relatively small changes of 
that number. For example, a pre-1997 induction motor of 
200 HP, 1800 rpm, totally enclosed fan-cooled design typ-
ically may have had an efficiency of 94.1 %. This same 
motor, after October 1997 was required to have an effi-
ciency of 95.0%, which is equivalent to about a 16% loss 
reduction. As stated above, most manufacturers after 1997 
c~mied the redesign fwt her on a strictly voluntary basis 
and offered a premium efficiency motor design of this 
same rating with a full-load efficiency of 95.8%, equiva-
lent to an additional 17% loss reduction, or even 96.2% 
(25% loss reduction above what is mandated by DOE and 
37% less losses than the pre-1997 design). Similar per-
centages of loss improvements were realized throughout 
the whole range of motors covered by the federal law. 
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It is clear from this example that shifting to higher 
efficiency motors could have a significant impact on the 
country's energy usage as well as electrical distribution 
infrastructure. Thus, in order to insure that motor manu-
facturers met the requirements of the law, the DOE also 
issued guidelines on how to decide whether the efficiency 
number stamped on a motor nameplate truly reflected the 
full-load motor performance. This resulted in the issuance 
of what came to be known as DOE's Final Rule [2]. 
DOE's Final Rule spells out the procedure a motor 
,manufacturer has to follow to substantiate the efficiency 
value stamped on the nameplate of its motors and, in par-
ticular, to prove that its motors are manufactured in accor-
dance with EPAct. The Final Rule specifically defines the 
following major items: 
1. The testing procedure to be used for induction motors 
2. The process to qualify a calculation method, if one is 
employed to calculate efficiency 
3. The labeling requirements as to motor full-load effi-
ciency 
4. The method to decide what value of efficiency should 
be stamped on the nameplate (compliance procedure) 
5. The procedure whereby DOE verifies that indeed the 
motors are correctly labeled (enforcement procedure) 
For about two decades, integral horsepower, 
polyphase, single-speed, induction motors manufactured 
in the U.S. have had a nominal efficiency stamped ori their 
nameplate in accordance with the requirements of the 
NEMA Standards [1], Section 12.59.2. The nameplate 
efficiency is chosen by the manufacturer of the motor from 
the allowed values of nominal efficiencies listed in Table 
12-9 of[l]. The NEMA Standard requires that the average 
efficiency of a large population of motors of the same 
design shall not be less than the value of nominal efficien-
cy chosen from this table and that no motor shall have an 
efficiency less than a minimum value associated to each 
nominal efficiency and also listed concurrently in Table 
12-9 of[ 1 ]. A section ofTable 12-9 is reported here for ref-
erence in Table 1. 
Table 1. NEMA Nameplate Efficiencies (expressed in 
percent), partial tabulation taken from Table 12-9 of [ 1] 
Minimum Efficiency 
Based on 20% Loss 








The labeling requirements of DOE's Final Rule are in 
agreement with this NEMA table and use the same values 
of nominal efficiencies. Although this much of this activi-
ty predates the adoption of Public Law 104.113 (National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995), the 
use of an industrial voluntary standard in a Federal Rule is 
consistent with that law. 
3. DOE's Compliance Procedure 
The section of DOE's Final Rule dealing with the 
compliance procedure is consistent with the approach 
specified in the NEMA standard. It prescribes that, taking 
a sample ofn motors (n 2: 5) each with measured efficien-
cies Xi (i =1, 2, .. n) and all of the same motor model for 
which the nameplate nominal efficiency, RE, had been 
selected, the average efficiency X of the sample be no 
less than the value obtained decreasing RE by an addi-
tional 5% of losses. RE is one of the efficiency values 
selected from those listed by NEMA in the first column of 
Table 1 (whenever possible, the symbols used in this paper 
are those of DOE's Final Rule). Furthermore, the mini-
mum sample efficiency of the sample lot shall not be less 
than the value calculated decreasing RE by an additional 
15% of losses. The DOE's compliance procedure is sum-
marized in Figure 1. 
A few observations are in order. First of all, one key 
feature to note in both the NEMA Standards and the DOE 
compliance procedure is that the nameplate efficiency is 
limited to one of a set of discrete values. While there are 
many practical advantages to this approach, e.g. providing 
some protection against the specification of insignificant 
1. Test a sample of n motors (n ;:: 5) obtaining effi-
ciencies Xi (i = 1, 2, .. n). 
2. Compute the sample mean: 
- 1 n 
X=- IXi 
ni=1 
3. Identify the minimum sample efficiency Xmin : 
X min = mir{Xi) 
4. Letting RE = nameplate nominal efficiency, both 
conditions below must be verified 
X> 100 
- 1+ 1.0{ ~~ -1) 
and 
X
min > r l 
1+ 1.1 ~~ -1 
Figure 1. Outline of DOE's Compliance Plan 
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differences, it is not statistically based. From a statistical 
sense, this procedure does not specify, assume, or rely on 
any particular underlying distribution, a mean, or a stan-
dard deviation. 
Secondly, the DOE compliance procedure allows the 
sample mean to fall below the value of RE by the equiva-
lent of an additional 5% loss. In this sense, it is more 
lenient than the NEMA Standards, although in requiring a 
maximum 15% loss deviation from RE for the minimum 
sample efficiency it is tighter than NEMA. As observed 
previously, the minimum values of the NEMA chart (right 
column of Table 1) are based on a 20% loss deviation from 
RE. 
Thirdly, there is no requirement for an upper limit to 
the efficiency: in principle, if there were an incentive to do 
so, a manufacturer could select a rating of RE even if the 
mean of his population exceeded the next higher value of 
allowed efficiencies. 
Therefore, RE is not, either in principle or in practice, 
the mean of the distribution but a benchmark used to 
define the greatest lower bound for what that mean may be 
(item 4 in Figure 1 ). The compliance procedure is based on 
an operational definition that provides the purchaser with 
a prescriptive description of the meaning of the nameplate 
efficiency rating. 
4. DOE's Enforcement Procedure 
According to DOE's Final Rule, the Secretary of 
Energy may order the testing of any motor design covered 
by the law to verify that it is in compliance with EPAct: 
this is the enforcement section of the Final Rule. The DOE 
sampling plan for enforcement testing [2] is summarized 
here in Figure 2 for convenience. 
The DOE section on the enforcement procedure fol-
lows a different approach than the compliance procedure. 
The enforcement plan imposes specific statistical assump-
tions that were not required to be present in the base lot of 
motors meeting the compliance procedures. At the opera-
tional level, this results in centering the plan around the 
use of the t distribution, as can be seen in Figure 2. Key 
assumptions for the valid application of the t distribution 
are that the underlying distribution from which the sam-
ples are drawn is distributed normally and that the mean of 
the underlying distribution is known. In the practical situ-
ations to which the DOE Rule is applied it is unlikely that 
either of these situations is realized. 
On the contrary, as already noted, the underlying dis-
tribution is not required to be normal to meet the compli-
ance procedure. This lack of harmony between the com-
pliance and enforcement procedures can be expected to 
result, in and of itself, in potential conflicts between the 
two. 
In addition, there is a fundamental weakness in the 
DOE's sampling plan for enforcement testing. The equa-
tion in step 5 of Figure 2 applies the statistics of the t dis-
tribution using RE as the distribution mean. As pointed out 
above, RE is not a mean but a rating for a machine lot. 
The statistical assumptions for enforcement lead to 
some counterintuitive results . For example, it can be 
shown that for any given set of values of nominal effi-
ciency RE, sample average 5(1, and sample size n 1, there 
is an interval of values for the sample standard deviation 
S 1 that guarantees that the sample meets the DOE enforce-
ment test. From the equations shown in steps 4, 5, and 6 of 
DOE's enforcement plan (Fig. 2) we can derive a first con-
dition for S 1, to assure passage of our sample, as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
From the equations in step 7 of DOE's enforcement 
plan (Fig. 2), we can derive a second condition for the 
sample standard deviation. Let for convenience 
A= __)(_12,_0_- _o.2R_E.L.,-) 
RE(20-0.2RE) 




Combining both conditions, we find the interval for 
S1 that assures that our sample will pass DOE's enforce-
ment test: 
(6) 
As long as S 1 falls in the interval shown above, the sam-
ple is sure to pass the enforcement test. 
While the concept that there may be a maximum per-
missible standard deviation is intuitive, the concept of the 
minimum value is cause for suspicion. As long as the sam-
ple mean 5(1 exceeds the nominal efficiency RE there is 
no difficulty since the standard deviation is always non-
negative. The problem arises when X1 is less than RE but 
still larger than the value of RE decreased by the equiva-
lent of 5% additional losses. This would qualify the lot 
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1. Test a sample of n1 motors (n1 ~ 5) obtaining effi-
ciencies Xi . 
2. Compute the sample mean 
- 1 n1 x1 =-I. Xi 
n1 i=1 
3. Compute the sample standard deviation : 
SE(:X1)= ~ 
-vn1 
5. Compute the lower control limit (RE = nameplate 
nominal efficiency, t = 2.5th percentile of the t distri-
bution for sample size n1 yielding 97.5% confidence 
level for one-tailed t-test) : 
LCL1 =RE-t·SE(X1) 
6. Compare: 
X1 < LCL1 ~ noncompliance : stop test 
X1 ~ LCL1 ~ continue with step 7 
7. Compute the recommended sample size and com-
pare: 
n = [ts1 ( 120- 0.2RE)J 
RE(20- 0.2RE) 
n::; n1 ~ in compliance : stop test 
n > n1 ~ noncompliance : continue with step 8 
8. Compute n2 = smallest integer equal to or greater 
than n-n1 but not greater than 20-n1.Test n2 addition-
al motors and repeat step 2 with expanded sample: 
- 1 n1+n2 
X2=-- I, Xi 
n1 +n2 i=1 
9. Using the same s1 as found in step 3 above, repeat 




10. Using the same t as in step 5 repeat step 5 for the 
expanded sample and decide on compliance: 
LCL2 =RE-t·SE(X2) 
X2 < LCL2 ~ noncompliance : stop test 
X2 ~ LCL2 ~ compliance stop test 
11 . If the above results in a determination of noncompli-
ance, the manufacturer has the option of expanding 
the sample size (but not to more than 20 units) in 
steps, repeating for each expanded new sample the 
same procedure outlined in steps 8, 9, and 10 above. 
Figure 2. DOE's Sampling Plan for Enforcement 
Testing (the symbols are those used in DOE's Final 
Rule) 
under DOE's compliance procedure. However, if the same 
lot were also the result of excelJent manufacturing meth-
ods, its standard deviation could be smalJer than the mini-
mum required by equation (6) above and, thus, the lot 
would fail the enforcement procedure. While it is easy to 
generate concrete examples to verify this point, it is suffi-
cient to note that, if the production methods were indeed 
ideal (S 1 = 0), the lot would never pass. 
This example shows that due to the different assump-
tions in the two tests, it is possible for a motor lot to pass 
DOE's compliance but not DOE's enforcement plan. This 
is troubling to a manufacturer that produces motors in a 
well run plant and labels them correctly in fulJ respect of 
DOE's compliance procedure. It would also be troubling 
to a buyer who chose to use the DOE enforcement proce-
dure to test compliance. The converse also may occur, 
namely that a motor lot may not pass the compliance pro-
cedure but instead be approved under the enforcement 
procedure. 
To see how this occurs, imagine a motor production 
method that is not in good control, so that some units may 
be welJ above the required RE while others are 9efinitely 
substandard and the motor lot should not be labeled with 
the chosen value of RE since it fails the compliance crite-
ria. Precisely because of this, however, the standard devi-
ation of the lot will be large enough to satisfY the mini-
mum condition of equation (6) and the same lot, that 
should have been rejected under compliance, will be 
accepted under the enforcement procedure for that chosen 
value ofRE. An example of this situation is given in Table 
2 where a hypothetical set of test data obtained under the 
enforcement procedure is reported. In this and all other 
examples, it is assumed that the nameplate efficiency is 
RE = 95% corresponding to a minimum efficiency of 
94.1 %. After the initial five tests, it is determined that an 
additional test is needed. This additional test results in the 
worst efficiency of the lot but its inclusion allows the lot 
to pass. 
The practical implication of this data set is that a man-
ufacturer that followed correctly the compliance proce-
dure would mark this lot with an efficiency of 94 .1 %. 
Because of the enforcement procedure, a marking of the 
lot with an efficiency of95.0% would instead be accepted 
under DOE's enforcement criteria. Thus, the enforcement 
plan would support a higher efficiency than the compli-
ance plan. 
A more radical variation on this theme is the case 
where motors of two different designs, one meeting the 
labeling requirements of RE = 95% and one being much 
inferior, have been intermixed (Table 3). Interestingly, this 
sample would qualifY the whole population of motors for 
passing under DOE's enforcement rule even though 60% 
of it is made up of markedly inferior units. 
The ones above are but three classes of cases where 
the conflict between compliance and enforcement is high-
Table 2. Application of DOE's Enforceme_nt Plan to a Hypothetical Sample I (efficiencies in percent) 
Std Lower 
Sample Sample Sample Dev. of Nominal Ctr1. Minimum 
Sample Eff. Data Mean Min. Std. Dev Max. Mean F.L. Eff. Lim. Sample Acceptance 
# X1 S1 S1 S1 SE(X1l RE LCL1 n Tests Action 
1 93.60 94.46 0.43 0.760 0.758 0.34 95.00 94.06 5.03 94.46>94.06 More 










Table 3. Application of DOE's Enforcement Plan to Some Hypothetical Sample 2: Example of Bimodal Distribution 
(efficiencies in percent) 
Std Lower 
Sample Sample Sample Dev. of Nominal Ctr1. Minimum 
Sample Eff. Data Mean Min. Std. Dev Max. Mean F.L. Eft. Lim. Sample Acceptance 
# X1 S1 S1 S1 SE(X1l RE LCL1 n Tests Action 






Table 4. Application of DOE's Enforcement Plan to Hypothetical Samples 3 and 4: Example of How the Enforcement 
Plan Rejects a Better Lot but Passes an Inferior One (efficiencies in percent) 
Sample Sample Sample 
Sample Eff. Data Mean Min. Std. Dev Max. 
# X1 81 81 81 










lighted. As was said in connection with equation (6), there 
is a whole continuum of possible test data capable of gen-
erating similar discrepancies. Not only is there conflict 
between the two procedures, there is also internal incon-
sistency within the enforcement test plan proper. Table 4 
shows how two samples with identical efficiency values 
except one, both passing the compliance test, are discrim-
inated by the enforcement test: oddly, the inferior sample 
passes enforcement while the better sample does not. 
5. Conclusions 
It is well recognized that any statistically based test 
has some probability of rejecting a good lot or accepting a 
bad one [6]. The aim, of course, is to minimize the likeli-
hood of either of these two outcomes. It must be empha-
sized, however, that the design of a statistical test is not the 
issue in this situation. The problems identified here are 
due to two major causes: 
I. The approaches used in defining the compliance and 
enforcement procedures are not congruent 
2. The statistics used in the enforcement procedure is 
incorrectly applied 
As a result of this, the key implications that have been 
identified are the following: 
a. In some cases the enforcement procedure will tolerate 
a higher nameplate efficiency than the compliance 
procedure. 
b. In some cases the enforcement procedure will reject 
lots whose efficiency was correctly specified under 
the compliance procedure. 
c. In some cases the enforcement procedure will pass 
inferior lots and reject better ones. 
Std Lower 
Dev. of Nominal Ctrl. Minimum 
Mean F.L. Eff. Lim. Sample Acceptance 




95.00 94.90 0.06 94.88<94.90 Reject 
95.00 94.71 0.48 94.80>94. 71 Accepl 
0.48<5 
This means that neither the manufacturer nor the 
buyer can have confidence that the procurement and 
installation of motors with higher nameplate efficiencies 
will produce a reduced demand on the electrical distribu-
tion system for the same amount of work done. 
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